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Abstract 
 
What is the rational response to disagreement with an epistemic peer? Some say the steadfast 
response of holding on to your own belief can be rational; others argue that some degree of 
conciliation is always rationally required. I argue that only an epistemological externalist 
about rationality — someone who holds that the rationality of a belief is partly constituted by 
factors outside a subject’s cognitive perspective — can defend the steadfast view. Or at least 
that this is so in the kinds of idealized cases of peer disagreement that take center stage in the 
current debate about disagreement. The argument has three steps. First, I show how rationality 
internalism motivates conciliationism: In view of the mutually recognized internal epistemic 
symmetry between peers, it would be arbitrary for either peer to hold on to her own belief. 
Second, I strengthen this line of thought by considering various proposed ‘symmetry 
breakers’ that appear to introduce a relevant asymmetry between peers, which could be used 
to defend the rationality of a steadfast response. I argue that none of these alleged symmetry 
breakers can help internalists. Third, I show how externalism does have the resources to 
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defend steadfastness and expose how extant defenses of steadfastness implicitly rely on 
externalist intuitions. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The problem of disagreement is familiar by now. What is the rational response when you find 
out that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about whether p? Proponents of conciliationism 
argue that you should move your credence in the direction of your peer or give your belief up. 
Proponents of steadfastness argue that you can be rational in sticking with your belief. 
 A striking feature of the debate about disagreement is the virtual absence of attempts 
to flesh out the relevant notion of rationality in more detail.1 The typical methodology is to 
present cases and to rely on intuitive judgments about what is rational in them. This is 
unfortunate, because how you understand rationality matters a great deal for what you can say 
about the rational response to peer disagreement. I will argue that only rationality externalists 
can defend steadfast views, at least in idealized cases of peer disagreement. 
 In section 2, I clarify what I mean by idealized cases of peer disagreement. Section 3 
provides characterizations of rationality internalism and externalism. In sections 4 and 5, I 
argue that rationality internalists lack the resources to defend a steadfast view. In section 6, I 
show that externalism does have the resources to defend a steadfast view. 
 
2. Idealized Disagreement 
 
The epistemological discussion tends to focus on what we can call idealized disagreement (cf. 
Lackey 2010: 303): known disagreement with a genuine epistemic peer, who is also 
recognized as such. It is doubtful whether what we say about such idealized cases provides 
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guidance for real-life disagreement. First, genuine epistemic peers may be rare or even 
nonexistent. Following Kelly (2005, pp. 174–5), peers are typically understood as each 
others’ equals with respect to (i) familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments bearing 
on the issue at hand and (ii) general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and 
freedom from bias.2 Various aspects of peerhood appear problematic in real life (King 2011; 
Frances 2010a, pp. 424–5). Perhaps each of us has a unique combination of epistemic virtues 
and vices that influences how we form our beliefs. Perhaps our evidence contains hard-to-
share seemings, insights, or feelings (Van Inwagen 1996, 2010; Sosa 2010). Or perhaps it is 
partly constituted by first-personal assessments and weightings of our sources of evidence. If 
so, then no one is ever anyone’s peer in a strict sense. Second, even if genuine peerhood is 
possible, perhaps we couldn’t recognize it. It may be that sharing all your evidence, knowing 
that both of you have done so, and verifying that you have understood each other correctly is 
unattainable, practically or even in principle. 
 When I claim that only externalists can be steadfast, I mean that externalism has the 
resources to defend a steadfast view in idealized disagreements, whereas internalism does not. 
It does not follow from this that internalists cannot defend a steadfast response in real-life 
disagreements. Since real-life disagreements rarely if ever meet the strict conditions of 
idealized disagreements, it will typically be possible to appeal to circumstances or factors of 
the disagreement that differ between you and your peer. Such asymmetries may then enable a 
steadfast response. 
 My conclusion thus has limited implications for what internalists can say about real-
life disagreements. At most it entails that, the more a real-life case resembles the idealized 
scenario, the harder it will be for internalists to defend a steadfast response. Nonetheless, it is 
an important theoretical result that there is a connection between the internalism-externalism 
divide in epistemology and views about the rational response to disagreement. 
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3. Internalism and Externalism 
 
In the disagreement literature ‘rational’ is used interchangeably with ‘justified’ (White 2005, 
p. 445; Feldman 2006, pp. 220f; Kelly 2010; Ballantyne & Coffman 2011).3 I’ll follow suit 
here. 
 Although internalism is characterized in different ways by different authors, there is 
widespread agreement that its core is the idea that all the factors that determine the rationality 
(justification) of a belief must be internal to the subject’s cognitive perspective, in the sense 
that they must accessible to her upon reflection. BonJour (2010a, p. 364) states: 
 
The most generally accepted account of this distinction is that a theory of justification is 
internalist if and only if it requires that all of the factors needed for a belief to be 
epistemically justified for a given person be cognitively accessible to that person, 
internal to his cognitive perspective.4 
 
Rationality-conferring factors can include things such as the grounds for the belief and their 
adequacy, evidence for its truth and the strength thereof, the belief’s being appropriately 
based on adequate grounds, or believed in view of the relevant evidence. 
 Externalism is the denial of internalism. It is the thesis that it is not the case that all the 
factors that determine the rationality of a belief must be internal to the subject’s cognitive 
perspective and accessible to her upon reflection. The negative characterization allows for 
different versions of externalism, depending on how many and which rationality-conferring 
factors are external to the subject’s cognitive perspective. Examples of external rationality-
conferring factors include: adequacy of the grounds for your belief (Alston 1988), reliability 
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of your belief-forming processes (Goldman 1979), proper functioning of your cognitive 
system (Bergmann 2006), virtuousness of your belief-formation (Sosa 2007; Greco 2010), or 
social relations in which you stand (Meeker 2004). 
 
4. From Internalism to Conciliationism 
 
Consider an idealized case of disagreement: Alice and Beth are epistemic peers and know this 
to be so. They disagree about whether p: Alice believes p and Beth believes not-p (or 
something that obviously entails it). What’s more, (i) both Alice and Beth are intelligent and 
epistemically responsible believers, and (ii) p is a proposition in their general area of 
competence; p is not something about which they are uninformed or ill-equipped to think 
about.5 
 In such a case, there’s a strong initial intuition to say that because their situations are 
entirely symmetrical in terms of epistemically relevant factors both Alice and Beth should 
adjust their respective beliefs in each other’s direction, and presumably withhold judgment 
about whether p. Considerations about epistemic symmetry underlie most of the defenses of 
conciliationism. Feldman, for instance, says: 
 
In situations of full disclosure, where there are not evident asymmetries, the parties to 
the disagreement would be reasonable in suspending judgement about the matter at 
hand. (Feldman 2006, p. 235) 
 
According to Christensen, the main motivation for conciliationism is: 
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that the peer’s disagreement gives one evidence that one has made a mistake in 
interpreting the original evidence, and that such evidence should diminish one’s 
confidence in P. (Christensen 2009, p. 2) 
 
Note that this is true for both peers: Both acquire evidence suggesting that they made a 
mistake and hence should diminish confidence in their beliefs. The thought is that, since 
there’s nothing available to the disagreeing peers to suggest an asymmetry between them with 
regard to how well-positioned they are to discern the truth or falsity of p, each should become 
doubtful about her belief and adjust her credence in the direction of the other or give up the 
belief.6 
 The first step in my argument is to note that these symmetry considerations are most 
compelling when understood along internalist lines: Everything that is cognitively accessible 
to Alice and Beth, both immediately and upon reflection, is wholly symmetrical. For all Alice 
and Beth can tell, the following things are true: 
 
- We are both intelligent people thinking about an issue about which we are competent. 
- Beth/Alice is my epistemic peer; she’s equally intelligent, adept at reasoning, etc. She is 
equally well-informed as I am and familiar with the evidence and arguments bearing on 
p. 
- We have disclosed and shared all our evidence. 
- We have verified whether we understand each other correctly on every relevant point. 
 
Given that both Alice and Beth hold these things to be true, or even know them to be true, 
everything that is relevant to rationally believing p or not-p really does seem to be 
symmetrical from Alice and Beth’s cognitive perspectives. Hence, neither one of them will 
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have cognitive access to a ‘symmetry breaker’7 which would allow them to discount the 
other’s opinion. For both Alice and Beth, sticking to their own belief seems arbitrary and thus 
irrational, just like it would be arbitrary to trust one of two thermometers with different 
readings, when you have no reason to assume that one is more reliable than the other.8 At first 
pass, then, it seems that rationality internalism indeed leads to conciliationism, by means of 
the powerful intuition that mutually recognized internal epistemic symmetry should motivate 
both peers to move their beliefs in each other’s direction. 
 
5. No Internal Symmetry Breakers 
 
Perhaps, however, the abstract characterization above overlooks relevant factors that might 
break the symmetry between Alice and Beth. One reason to take this possibility seriously is 
that although proponents of conciliationism appeal to symmetry in defending their view, they 
often deny that their view leads to widespread agnosticism. They think the symmetry can be 
broken in many cases. Therefore, the second step of my argument is to investigate whether 
closer inspection reveals symmetry breakers that allow internalists to defend a steadfast 
response in idealized disagreements after all. 
 Let me set aside a few red herrings first. Peers may become aware of special 
circumstances that negatively affect the other party’s ability to assess the evidence, reason, or 
understand the relevant considerations on this particular occasion. All sorts of things could be 
relevant: physical or psychological well-being, disturbing factors in the environment that 
someone is sensitive to, a blind-spot with regard to the specific proposition at hand, etc.9 This 
may happen, but when it does, we’re no longer dealing with a case of idealized disagreement. 
Instead, in such a case Alice and Beth cease to be peers, even though they generally are. 
8 
 Another possibility is that the social-epistemic environment affects Alice and Beth’s 
disagreement. If Alice finds out that, say, 10 further peers independently agree with her about 
p while no peer thinks that not-p, or that a substantial majority of experts believe that p, she 
acquires a strong reason to hold on to her belief that p. Beth should become much less 
confident that not-p and perhaps should start believing that p instead.10 (Recall that in an 
idealized disagreement Alice and Beth have already shared all their evidence, so it cannot be 
the case that Beth has access to an especially powerful piece of evidence that would sway 
both Alice and the other peers or experts.) This scenario, too, is not a case of idealized 
disagreement. It may have been one before the evidence about the social consensus came in, 
but once Alice and Beth become aware of the consensus it no longer is. 
 What about other possible symmetry breakers? Kelly (2005, pp. 178–80) suggests that 
the mere fact that Alice and Beth disagree about p could be a relevant symmetry breaker. 
Alice can think that she is right and that, therefore, Beth must have made a mistake on this 
particular occasion (and Beth can think likewise about Alice). This is consistent with their 
also continuing to regard each other as genuine peers and as having shared all their evidence. 
However, this response would be arbitrary from both their perspectives (e.g., Christensen 
2007; Elga 2007).11 Their disagreement gives Alice and Beth higher-order evidence that they 
may have made a mistake. In view of the mutually recognized symmetry, each should realize 
that she is just as likely as her peer to have made a mistake. The mere fact that it is she herself 
who believes p doesn’t give Alice a good reason to think she, rather than Beth, is right (and 
likewise for Beth). 
 It is tempting to draw a general conclusion from this: An acceptable symmetry breaker 
must always be independent of the reasoning or other belief-forming process by which the 
peers initially formed their beliefs.12 However, both Kelly (2010) and Lackey (2010) offer 
apparent counterexamples to this independence constraint. For instance, in cases where our 
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peer reports a belief that strikes us as utterly absurd or beyond the pale, we do want to allow 
this assessment of ours to function as a symmetry breaker, even though it does not seem to be 
independent of how we originally formed our belief.13 Whether or not some general 
independence constraint ultimately stands up to scrutiny need not concern us here, however, 
because the point at issue is whether Alice could break the symmetry by simply relying on her 
own belief-forming process to discount Beth’s contrary belief. Surely this sort of direct 
dependence on Alice’s original belief-formation is unacceptably question-begging when Alice 
recognizes that Beth is her peer and is hence equally well-positioned to form a correct belief 
as to whether p. 
 Perhaps internalists could point to subjective or first-personal aspects of evidence to 
break the symmetry. Some evidence could be irreducibly first-personal (e.g., your feeling that 
you are in pain) or evaluations of publicly available evidence could have an irreducibly first-
personal quality14. Since first-personal phenomena are accessible from within the subject’s 
cognitive perspective, they can count towards the rationality of beliefs on an internalist 
understanding of rationality. Nonetheless, it would be hard or impossible to share them 
because of their first-personal character. Although subjects can attempt to share their first-
personal perspectives with each other, they cannot make one another have them. 
 Given that we’re considering idealized cases of peer disagreement, it cannot be the 
case that either Alice or Beth has significantly different irreducibly first-personal evidence, 
for that would violate the definition of peerhood. (There couldn’t be genuine peer 
disagreement about whether, say, Alice has a headache, since Alice would possess crucial 
first-personal evidence that Beth lacks and hence there would be a significant evidential 
asymmetry between them.) Having different first-personal evaluations of the evidence would 
seem to be compatible with peerhood, though — at least, that is what almost most participants 
in the debate assume, as we shall see presently.15 
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 I will now argue that appeals to a first-personal perspective to break the symmetry 
cannot be successful. I’ll first give a general characterization of the problem and then we’ll 
look at how some examples from the literature suffer from it. The problem is this: Given the 
mutually recognized symmetry of Alice and Beth’s situations, for either one of them to trust 
their own first-personal perspective over that of the other seems arbitrary, for the same 
reasons as given in the previous section. There’s nothing epistemically special about a first-
personal perspective that warrants trusting it more than a recognized peer’s perspective. So in 
the absence of reasons for thinking that their own perspective is epistemically superior, both 
Alice and Beth acquire higher-order evidence that their perspective may be misleading and 
should therefore become hesitant to continue relying on it. (And note that if there were such 
reasons, Alice and Beth — being peers — would have already shared them. Given that we’re 
assuming that there still is disagreement, however, they must have evaluated these reasons 
differently.) Alice will realize that Beth, too, has a first-personal perspective which makes her 
think she is right. Their internal situation is again symmetrical, so sticking to their own belief 
would be arbitrary and hence irrational (and likewise for Beth). 
 One could try to resist this objection by arguing that there is a good reason to trust 
one’s own first-personal perspective more than that of another. A suggestion from Wedgwood 
(2010, pp. 239–243) about trusting one’s own moral intuitions can be adapted in this 
direction. Wedgwood claims that it can be rational for me to trust my moral intuitions rather 
than your conflicting intuitions, because only my intuitions can play the role of directly 
guiding my moral belief-formation. Your intuitions cannot. At best, they guide my belief-
formation indirectly, through my beliefs about them. By analogy, one could propose that 
because only my first-personal perspective on the evidence can guide my belief-formation 
directly, it can be rational for me to trust it over yours. I am not convinced by this. Although 
the observation that someone’s own intuitions or other first-personal experiences play a 
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special role by directly guiding one’s belief-formation is in order, what remains unclear is 
why this fact should make it epistemically rational to trust my own first-personal perspective 
more than yours (given that we are peers). It may be practically rational or even inevitable to 
trust my own first-personal perspective, but that doesn’t show that it is more likely to be right. 
To repeat the earlier point, disagreement with a peer gives you higher-order evidence that 
your first-personal perspective may be mistaken and that it could thus be wrong for you to 
keep trusting it, no matter how directly it guides your belief-formation. 
 Christensen (2007) and Elga (2007) also appeal to first-personal symmetry breakers. 
Christensen considers a case in which a peer reports a seemingly absurd belief about the size 
of your share of a restaurant check. The reason why it is not rational for you to move your 
belief towards your peer’s absurd belief is that in this case the best explanation of your 
disagreement is that your peer has made the mistake, and not you. This is so, because the 
absurdity of her belief gives you a reason to think she, unlike you, has not employed 
commonsense checking, which is an extremely reliable procedure to check the correctness of 
simple mathematical beliefs (Christensen 2007, p. 201). I don’t think this works. First of all, 
one may doubt whether this is even a possible example of peer disagreement. For it is hard to 
see how someone who calculates an absurdly high share of a bill and doesn’t immediately 
check and correct her belief could be a peer of any reasonably educated and healthy adult. 
But, second, even if we grant that the case is possible, it’s not clear that Christensen has 
identified a feasible symmetry breaker. The mere fact that someone is your peer already gives 
you evidence that she will have brought commonsense checking to bear on her calculation, 
since this is what normally functioning educated adults do. But if that isn’t enough, we can 
amend the case so that your peer assures you in all sincerity you that she has used 
commonsense checking (cf. Bogardus 2009, p. 328–9).16 Once you learn this, the symmetry 
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breaker is undermined and you no longer have a reason to think that the best explanation of 
your disagreement is that your peer has made a mistake. 
 Elga (2007, pp. 488–91) points to the “circumstances of the disagreement” as a source 
of potential symmetry breakers. I already identified several of these as red herrings near the 
beginning of this section, but in discussing a similar restaurant case as Christensen, Elga 
mentions one specific circumstance that may still be relevant here. It is your extreme 
confidence in your own belief, together with your assessment of your peer’s belief as insane. 
Again, I don’t see that this bit of first-personal information breaks the symmetry. For we can 
easily restore symmetry by adding that your peer returns the compliment by being extremely 
confident of her belief while finding yours insane (cf. Bogardus, pp. 329–30). Once you 
recognize this, there is no symmetry breaker anymore and you again lack reason to prefer 
your belief over hers. 
 Finally, Bogardus (2009, pp. 330–2) offers yet another variant of a first-personal 
symmetry breaker. He argues that introspection and rational intuition sometimes give us 
direct access to facts that we can “just see to be true”. Sometimes you have “knowledge from 
direct acquaintance” that your own view is correct or that of your peer false. If you have such 
infallible knowledge, it will be rational to stick to your belief. This is why you shouldn’t give 
in to your peer in the restaurant cases discussed by Christensen and Elga. Does this provide a 
symmetry breaker for internalists seeking to defend a steadfast view? Again, I think not. First, 
one might be skeptical about the possibility of infallible knowledge as such. Fallibilism for all 
kinds of knowledge is widely accepted in contemporary epistemology (Dougherty 2010). 
With the possible exceptions of elementary mathematical, logical, and conceptual truths and 
truths about the contents of our own consciousness — topics about which genuine peer 
disagreement seems impossible or unlikely anyway — it seems implausible that humans 
could possess infallible knowledge about anything. Given fallibilism, disagreement with a 
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known peer is exactly the kind of thing that makes the possibility of error salient and should 
thus lead you to question your initial belief. At best, then, this suggestion will work for a very 
small subclass of disagreements, to wit those that concern a topic about which we can obtain 
infallible knowledge and could conceivably disagree with a peer. Second, however, even if 
there are truths we can know infallibly, it’s not clear that Bogardus’s proposal can do much 
for the rationality internalist, who can only help herself to factors that are available from 
within her cognitive perspective.17 Consider what an act of infallibly knowing something by 
introspection or rational intuition could look like from within your cognitive perspective. 
Presumably, you would form a belief and feel certain of its truth; it would seem to you that 
you just see that the belief is true and that you couldn’t possibly be mistaken. But, crucially, 
the fact that you infallibly know something remains outside your cognitive perspective. Even 
if they exist, instances of infallible knowledge will presumably not come with a special 
mental halo to single them out from lesser kinds of knowledge.18 Internalists, then, can only 
appeal to infallible knowledge in so far as it is accompanied by internal markers like extreme 
confidence, feelings of certainty, and similar cognitively accessible phenomena. These 
markers, however, could again be entirely symmetrical in the disagreeing parties. Alice could 
infallibly know that p and Beth mistakenly believe that not-p, yet both could experience the 
same confidence, certainty, etc. and sincerely report this to each other, so that their situations 
would again end up being entirely symmetrical.19 The same considerations as before then lead 
to a council of conciliation.20 
 In sum, then, first-personal perspectives on the evidence do not break the symmetry in 
any relevant way. Since this exhausts the options for internalists, the conclusion from the 
previous section is vindicated: Internalists cannot be steadfast. 
 
6. Externalism and Steadfastness 
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The argument so far is incomplete. Perhaps the reason that internalists cannot defend a 
steadfast view in cases of idealized disagreement is that nobody can. So the third step of my 
argument is to show that this is not the case. Externalism does have the resources to defend 
the rationality of a steadfast response.21 One clarification: I aim to show that some forms of 
externalism that are reasonably plausible on independent grounds can support a steadfast 
response to idealized disagreement, not merely that it is possible to gerrymander an externalist 
account of rationality, which supports a steadfast response. Doing the latter would be too 
easy. For instance, if rational belief is equated with reliably formed true belief, only one of 
the disagreeing parties will have a rational belief in the first place, to which she should then 
probably hold on. An account that has truth immediately built into the conditions for 
rationality, however, is hardly defensible, since everyone agrees that there are instances of 
rationally held but false beliefs. 
 I’ll briefly introduce one paradigmatic form of externalism to explain how the problem 
of disagreement is most naturally construed for externalists and then show how resources 
from various strands of the literature on externalism can be employed to defend a steadfast 
position. Alvin Goldman (1979) initially proposed a simple and robust form of externalism, 
process reliabilism. According to it, a belief is rational iff it has been produced by a reliable 
cognitive process, i.e., a process that produces a high ratio of true over false beliefs (in normal 
circumstances in the actual world). 
 It might seem that a steadfast response follows directly from this construal of 
rationality. In the idealized case of disagreement we’re considering both Alice and Beth use a 
reliable process to form their respective beliefs and both therefore have a rational belief. 
Learning that their peer disagrees doesn’t change this fact. Therefore both Alice and Beth 
should stick to their beliefs. But this line of reasoning overlooks a crucial consideration: 
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Forming beliefs through testimony from a reliable source is also a reliable cognitive process. 
So when Alice learns about Beth’s contrary belief, she ends up with two conflicting beliefs, 
both of which have been formed by a reliable process. This conflict must be handled.22 
 The default move is to augment the basic account of rationality with a no-defeater 
clause to the effect that only beliefs that do not have undefeated defeaters are rational 
(Goldman 1986, p. 112f.; Bergmann 2006, pp. 153–77; Greco 2010, pp. 156–73). Following 
Bergmann (2005, pp. 422–4), we can understand a defeater as an experience or propositional 
attitude that one comes to have and that takes away the rationality of one’s initial belief. 
Defeaters come in two kinds: a rebutting defeater is a ground or reason to think that your 
initial belief is false and an undercutting defeater is a ground or reason to think that the 
grounds or reasons for your initial belief are not indicative of its truth.23 Peer disagreement 
presents a defeater, at least at first sight. Since your peer’s belief contradicts yours, the 
defeater is most naturally construed as a rebutting defeater. But by making salient the 
possibility that you made a mistake in forming your initial belief, disagreement perhaps also 
casts doubt on the reliability of your belief-forming process, thus constituting an undercutting 
defeater. 
 So disagreement does pose a challenge to externalist accounts of rationality by 
presenting a defeater. The crucial question is whether this defeater can (sometimes) be 
defeated. If so, a steadfast response becomes possible. It is precisely here that externalists can 
appeal to external factors that are unavailable to internalists to break the symmetry. They can 
urge that, even though there are no internally accessible asymmetries between the two peers, 
it is nonetheless the case that asymmetrical factors external to the peers’ cognitive 
perspectives make one of them rational in holding on to her belief and the other not. To see 
how this could go, I’ll sketch some options. My goal is not to develop a detailed defense of 
any of these options; I merely want to show how externalism contains resources for doing so. 
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 Externalists who explain rationality in terms of proper cognitive functioning 
(Bergmann 2006) can argue that, in some cases of peer disagreement, proper functioning 
requires that you hold on to your belief. Externalists who explain rationality in terms of 
virtuous belief-formation (Sosa 2007; Greco 2010) can argue that a virtuous cognitive agent 
would in fact be disposed to hold on to her own belief in some cases of disagreement. In such 
cases, disagreement doesn’t give you an undefeated defeater after all. Of course, this raises 
questions: Why would proper functioning sometimes require steadfastness and why would a 
virtuous agent sometimes be disposed steadfastly? The externalist could answer that no 
further systematic arguments can be given to demonstrate that this is indeed what proper 
functioning or virtuous belief-formation requires. The most she can do to convince others is to 
present suitable cases in which one is supposed to see that this is how things are. This, for 
instance, is the line Bergmann (2009, p. 345) takes.24 
 Even if this position is correct, there is something unsatisfactory about not having 
some argument for why a steadfast response is correct in some cases. Alternatively, then, the 
externalist can make an effort to work out the mechanics of cases in which disagreement does 
not give you a defeater for your initial belief. Kelly (2010) serves as a good example of this. 
On the view he favors, the Total Evidence View, the peer who has in fact evaluated the first-
order evidence (i.e., the evidence apart from the disagreement) correctly will typically be in a 
stronger epistemic position than her peer, who mistakenly thinks she has evaluated the first-
order evidence correctly. Specifically, she will have a better justification than her peer for 
thinking that the first-order evidence supports her view. This is because correctly responding 
to the evidence creates ‘upward epistemic push’ (ibid., p. 159): It gives you justification for 
also believing that your evidence supports your belief. For the peer in the stronger epistemic 
position, a steadfast response is rational. 
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 Now note that the factor creating the asymmetry between the peers is who has in fact 
evaluated the first-order evidence correctly. Crucially, this is not something that is accessible 
form within the peers’ cognitive perspectives, as Kelly himself admits when he writes that “as 
a phenomenological matter, there might be no introspectible difference between how things 
seem when one is responding correctly and how things seem when one is not” (ibid., p. 169). 
This is really to say an external factor determines the rationality of the peers’ responses to 
disagreement, which makes Kelly’s view an externalist one according to the definition given 
in section 3.25 
 Lackey’s (2010) ‘justificationist view’ provides another example. Although she 
doesn’t intend her view to apply to the idealized cases of disagreement I have been 
considering, it can easily be co-opted to this end. The core of her view is that a steadfast 
response is in order in cases where one peer’s initial belief is highly justified and she has a 
symmetry breaker in the form of ‘personal information’ about the cognitive processes she 
used to arrive at your original belief. This personal information can comprise evidence from 
introspection or intuition about the genuine quality of your evidence, the strength of your 
justification, or the correctness of your belief. I stand by my earlier conclusion that such 
personal information, when understood along internalist lines, cannot provide a good 
symmetry breaker in cases of idealized disagreements, but the important point here is that 
Lackey explicitly says that she construes justification externalistically, as requiring the 
reliability of the belief-forming process in question (ibid., p. 320). Since having a highly 
justified original belief is one of the factors that accounts for the rationality of a steadfast 
response, we again find that an external factor provides a relevant symmetry breaker.26 
 In conclusion, then, externalist accounts of rationality indeed make it possible to 
defend a steadfast response, even in idealized cases of peer disagreement. And that completes 
the third and final step of my argument. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Epistemic rationality internalism leads to conciliationism in idealized cases of peer 
disagreement. Since both peers must grant that their situations are entirely symmetrical and 
that it is impossible to obtain a symmetry breaker from within their own cognitive 
perspectives, each should adjust her belief in the direction of the other. Not doing so would be 
arbitrary. Rationality externalism does make it possible to defend a steadfast response to 
idealized peer disagreement. In essence, this is because externalists, unlike internalists, can 
appeal to factors having to do with the de facto asymmetry between the peers’ opposing 
beliefs, which are unavailable from within their cognitive perspectives. Only externalists can 
thus be steadfast. 
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1 Ballantyne & Coffman (2011a) are an exception. They show how views on evidence and rationality distilled 
from earlier epistemological literature bear on the Uniqueness Thesis (White 2005; Feldman 2007, p. 205). 
2 Feldman (2006) adds a third condition to the effect that peers must have disclosed their evidence fully. This is 
fine, but (i) can also be read as already entailing full disclosure. 
3 Fumerton (2006) does the same. See Pritchard (2010, pp. 49–51) for a brief discussion of the issues involved in 
identifying rational with justified belief and Audi (2003) for an account that construes them differently. 
4 For similar characterizations, see Steup (1996, p. 84), Audi (2003, pp. 240–2). Feldman and Conee (2001) offer 
an alternative account of internalism as mentalism: the thesis that all the factors determining rationality are 
mental, i.e., ‘internal to the person’s mental life’, but not necessarily accessible upon reflection. For arguments 
that this account of internalism is misguided, see Bonjour (2010b, pp. 34–6) and Bergmann (2006, pp. 45–75). 
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5 Such conditions are typically not stated explicitly, but they strike me as sensible additions. It’s not so clear 
what to make of situations in which both peers are dimwitted and epistemically irresponsible, or when they hold 
beliefs about issues wide outside their areas of competence. 
6 The defenses of conciliationism in Christensen (2007), Elga (2007), and Bogardus (2009) also hinge on 
considerations of symmetry. 
7 I borrow this term from Lackey (2010, p. 309), who credits Nathan Christiansen for coming up with it. 
8 On this thermometer analogy, see White (2009). Enoch (2010) even claims the thermometer analogy underlies 
all defenses of conciliationism but then argues forcefully that the analogy is misguided. 
9 Elga (2007, pp. 488–91) stresses the importance for conciliationism of taking into account such “circumstances 
of the disagreement.” 
10 See Frances (2010b, pp. 71–4) for a brief exploration of the epistemic significance of consensus among a 
group of peers or superiors. 
11 For this reason, Kelly (2010, pp. 138–9) retracts his earlier position. 
12 Christensen (2007; 2011) and Elga (2007) explicitly endorse such an independence constraint. 
13 Christensen (2011), however, argues that this is not so. He claims that Kelly’s and Lackey’s cases fail to 
constitute counterexamples to a properly understood independence constraint. 
14 It is hard to give uncontroversial examples of this, but one could think of the impression an argument makes 
on you or intuitions you have about philosophical positions. E.g., an argument or position striking you as feeble, 
even while you’re unable (so far) to pinpoint any objective problems with it. 
15 To claim that having different first-personal evaluations of the evidence is incompatible with being peers 
makes the conditions of peerhood virtually impossible to satisfy. Such a move would thus define the problem of 
peer disagreement away, although most of the same questions would then resurface as questions about the 
rational response to disagreement with near-peers. 
16 For those who doubt that this makes sense, I would argue that if the case was possible in the first place, then 
this should be possible as well. 
17 What follows isn’t necessarily a criticism of Bogardus. Since he doesn’t say whether his proposal should be 
understood along internalist or externalist lines, it could be that he is really thinking along externalist lines, in 
which case the proposal may well work, as I’ll suggest below (cf. note 26). 
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18 Unless you endorse a version of the KK principle from which it follows that infallible knowledge 
automatically gives you (infallible?) second-order knowledge that you know infallibly, which seems implausible 
in excelsis. 
19 I will readily admit that this is implausible — perhaps impossible — for cases where the disagreement 
concerns an area where infallible knowledge may be possible. Viz., could Alice really feel certain that 5 + 7 = 12 
because she infallibly knows it, while Beth, who is supposed to be her peer, feels equally certain that 5 + 7 = 13? 
Then again, as I said above about Christensen’s restaurant case, it is implausible that there could be genuine peer 
disagreement in such cases in the first place (cf. also note 16 above). Once we’ve accepted the latter possibility, 
however, the former should also be granted. 
20 An anonymous referee pointed out that Fumerton’s acquaintance theory of noninferential justification 
(Fumerton 1995) could be employed to buttress Bogardus’s proposal, at least when Fumerton’s theory is 
interpreted along infallibilist lines (which is what Fumerton has sometimes had in mind (cf. Poston 2010), even 
though he has recently argued in favor of a fallibilist interpretation (Fumerton 2010)). On this account, for a 
subject to have noninferential justification for a belief that p, the subject must be directly acquainted with her 
belief that p, the fact that p, and the correspondence relation between the fact and the belief. Since acquaintance 
entails awareness, and hence cognitive access, the theory is clearly internalist. Now suppose Alice and Beth 
disagree about whether p. As it turns out, Alice has infallible noninferential justification for her belief that p, 
while Beth merely thinks that she does. Since only Alice, and not Beth, is in fact directly acquainted with the 
fact that p and the correspondence between that fact and her belief, it will not be the case that all their internal 
markers are exactly the same. Alice has a relevant symmetry breaker. Hence, we have an internalist account of 
rationality (justification) that allows one to defend a steadfast response to disagreement with a known peer. 
 While a full discussion of Fumerton’s views is beyond the pale here, I will say three things in response. 
First, if there indeed is infallible noninferential justification, it will be for propositions about which genuine peer 
disagreement seems impossible. Perhaps I can be infallibly justified in believing that I am in intense pain, but 
that is not something about which I can disagree with a peer, since the evidence is crucially first-personal. 
Perhaps I can be infallibly justified that 5 + 7 = 12 (but: what would it mean to be ‘directly acquainted’ with the 
fact that 5 + 7 = 12?), but again it seems that there couldn’t be a disagreeing peer, since any educated and 
healthy adult who understands the relevant concepts will agree that 5 + 7 = 12. For any case about which 
genuine peer disagreement is conceivable, it seems our justification will be fallible (even if it is noninferential). 
Second, I’m not sure that sense can be made of the suggestion that the internal markers will really be 
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asymmetrical in a case where Alice has infallible noninferential justification and Beth sincerely and confidently 
thinks she does but in fact doesn’t. As I argued above in response to Bogardus’s proposal, considered purely 
from within one’s cognitive perspective, an instance of infallibly knowing that p will presumably look exactly 
like an instance of thinking that one infallibly knows that p. It’s easy to see how markers like certainty, 
confidence, and believing that you couldn’t possibly be mistaken are internally accessible and distinguishable 
from their counterparts, but what could it be for actual acquaintance with the fact that p to be both accessible and 
distinguishable from merely apparent direct acquaintance with an alleged fact that not-p? Third, even if Alice 
has infallible noninferential justification and is thus directly aware of the fact that p and the correspondence of 
that fact with her belief that p, it seems that her peer Beth’s reporting that she believes that not-p should at least 
lead Alice to consider the possibility that she is mistaken. To assure herself that she isn’t, she would have to 
acquire a higher-order justified belief that she is infallibly justified in her first-order belief that p. Apart from the 
fact that we see the beginnings of a vicious regress here (cf. Ballantyne 2011 for a similar regress argument 
against Fumerton’s view), this leads to a dilemma. (a) If there is only fallible (inferential or noninferential) 
justification for this second-order belief, the possibility that she is mistaken will remain salient for Alice and it 
would be arbitrary for her to hold on to her belief. (b) To claim that there is also infallible (noninferential) 
justification for this second-order belief, however, seems exceedingly implausible. Alice would have to be 
directly acquainted with the fact that she has infallible justification for her belief that p and of the 
correspondence relation between this fact and her belief that she is so justified in believing that p. It doesn’t 
seem that second-order facts about our justification and their relations with our second-order beliefs are the sorts 
of things we are directly acquainted with, nor is it clear that such facts could be accessible from within our 
cognitive perspectives. At any rate, we can conclude that internalists who want to defend a steadfast response to 
disagreement are driven towards a extremely demanding and wildly implausible conception of infallible 
justification. I think it’s safe to take that as support for the overall argument of this paper. 
21 Ballantyne & Coffman (2011a) argue that rationality externalism, when combined with most prominent 
conceptions of the nature of evidence, entails the falsity of the Uniqueness Thesis. Conciliationism is often taken 
to carry with it a commitment to Uniqueness (Kelly 2010, p. 121; Ballantyne & Coffman 2011b). This suggests 
that if Uniqueness is false, it should be easier to defend a non-conciliationist (steadfast) view. Since I intend to 
show that rationality externalism (which — if Ballantyne & Coffman are right — should lead many of its 
proponents to reject Uniqueness) indeed allows one to defend a steadfast response, our conclusions are 
complementary. I only learned about their paper after I had written most of the present paper. 
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22 The same problem arises on other crude forms of externalism, on which rational belief is construed as being 
the result of properly functioning cognitive mechanisms or of virtuous belief-formation. 
23 This distinction goes back at least to Pollock (1974, pp. 41–3), where they are called type I and type II 
defeaters respectively. 
24 Greco (2010, pp. 167–73) also claims that in some cases a virtuous agent will in fact respond to a defeater by 
giving up her belief, whereas in others she won’t, without attempting to give an account of the differences 
between the two kinds of cases that warrant these responses. 
25 It is remarkable that Kelly himself explicitly disavows the externalist label (2010, p. 169). He argues that his 
view resembles internalist views in an important respect: “On the Total Evidence View, what it is reasonable for 
one to believe always depends on one’s total evidence, and only considerations of which one is aware are 
eligible for inclusion in one’s total evidence” (ibid.). I cannot help but think that this is confused. This gloss on 
his own view omits the crucial fact that what it is ultimately reasonable for the peers to believe also depends on 
who has in fact responded correctly to the evidence. And that, as he himself grants, is not a consideration of 
which one is aware. 
26 Yet another option would be to interpret Bogardus’s (2009) view, discussed above, in an explicitly externalist 
fashion as claiming that the peer who has in fact introspected or intuited correctly that she is right or her peer 
wrong will be rational to hold on to her belief. As I said above, however, I think this view can only offer solace 
for a very limited subclass of disagreements concerning topics about which peer disagreement is unlikely in the 
first place. 
